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ABSTRACT
This study looks at the relationsip between hospital ownership and hospital performance. Efforts are made to focus on the financial rather than legal attributes of 
ownership by utilizing and an agency model of firm behaviour. 
Agency theory is a better of firm performance in hospitals 
than the property rights paradigm which is often applied. This 
is especially true where questions of ownership are often 
mistaken for questions of control. Importantly, the study fail 
to supports a property rights view of hospital ownership and 
performance, suggesting instead the importance of influences 
such as access to capital markets and the agents controlling 
the firm. These are key ingredients to which hospitals need 
to respond in today’s competitive environment.
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There is a widespread interest in the relationship between hospital own­
ership and hospital performance. This paper looks at the hospital ownership 
and performance question from a corporate finance perspective. This perspec­
tive has been generally lacking in the previous studies. Every effort is made to 
distinguish the financial ramifications o f  varying ownership from the legal and 
ethical considerations more often discussed. The observations made here are 
applicable to a wide range o f  services and industries that operate in regulated or 
otherwise imperfect markets with a variety o f  ownership types, and not solely 
within the context o f  hospitals.
Literature Review
There is a large and growing literature on this subject but much o f it 
seems poorly focused with respect to the effects o f ownership per se. The sim­
plicity with which hospitals are categorised by ownership can hide the diffi­
culty o f  discerning ownership’s influence on performance. There is an even more 
fundamental concern o f what constitutes ownership o f a hospital and whether, 
ownership should have any influence on organizational performance. This point 
will be taken up in later discussion.
The order o f  presentation is the following:
1. The arguments (theories) as to the importance o f ownership on hospital per­
formance M ill be presented:
that which alleges that ownership makes a difference in hospital performance 
and that which implies different ownership types perform equally.
2. The evidence on hospital performance by ownership will be discussed.
3. Reference is made to the financial agency cost literature which undermines 
the present study.
There have always been a number o f private hospitals in Australia. Since 
the implementation o f Medicare, private hospitals have witnessed a sizeable 
growth in numbers as well as a change in the way many o f them are organized. 
This implies that private hospitals’expansion should be viewed at as their meet­
ing a growing population’s need for medical services that traditional interest
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were either too slow or uninterest in providing 1* (Kushman & Nuckton, 1977 
p. 189-204).
This same development o f the private hospital is portrayed as alarming” 
by some traditionalists in health care. The shift in power from medical profes­
sionals to corporate decision makers (Reiman, 1980), and the concept o f mak­
ing a profit from people’s illnesses is seen as distasteful. (Gray, 1986). This is 
in stark contrast to the rest o f  the economy where the traditional view o f profit 
has more to  do with the efficient allocation o f  resources than it does to 
“gauging”the public o f putting them at risk o f injury.
It is taken for granted that the role o f these institutions is profitability 
for their shareholders (Reiman, 1980). The performance aspect o f this is greater 
productivity on the part o f private hospitals 2*. (By implication, the objectives 
o f tax exempted hospitals and government hospitals are different and this sets 
up the immediate, surface expectation that hospital performance will differ by 
the design and “structure”o f ownership). The efficiency question in private hos­
pitals, from the theoretical perspective, has usually centered around the argu­
ment o f  property rights. Empirically, the question o f effectiveness becomes 
whether or not private hospitals have the largest “bottom-line”per patient day 
or admission across categories o f hospitals.
PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY
Property rights theory is not limited, o f course, to hospitals. It pertains 
to any industry where there are firms o f  differing ownership. Property rights 
theory maintains that when individual decision makers can be clearly identified 
as owning the firm, they have a vested interest in seeing it run effectively. There 
is a correlation between effort and gain. According to H.E. Freeh, III, property 
rights theory assumes that the decision maker has the right to:
1. decide about the use o f the firm’s resources,
2. keep the residual, and
3. capitalize any wealth gains o f the firm by selling his rights. (1976, p. 143)
1 * One study verified that private hospitals respond faster to rises and falls in population changes 
and verified that this was good for the efficient provision of hospital services. See Kushman, 
J.E. and Nuckton, C.F., “Further Evidence on the Relative Performance of Proprietory and Non 
Profit Hospitals,"Medical Care, 15:3 (March, 1977).
2* This study will not get into the social, almost moral question that profitability in health 
care poses for some critics of the private institutions. See both of Reiman’s work cited 
and also Gray.
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Thus, owner oversight ensures the constant pursuit o f the most profit­
able level ofoperation. In institutions where property rights are non-existent or 
ill defined, such as the government hospital, the decision maker has no claim to 
the residual and cannot capitalize additions to the firm’s wealth. Under these 
conditions, it is assumed that the asymmetric opportunity for personal gain will 
make the private hospital perform better that the government hospital in the 
same industry.
Studies have been done in several industries where private firms inter­
act with government firms in an attempt to either confirm or deny the property 
rights paradigm. Davies’s study o f Australian airlines supports the contention 
that private firms outperform their public rivals (1971,p. 149-165).
According to Davies, the reason for associating better performance with 
private ownership is twofold: (classic property rights).
1. the ability to transfer ownership allows for specialization o f owner interests 
and skills, making the capital market more efficient and
2. the correlation between effort and rewards/costs that goes with the property 
rights contentions (1971,p. 149-165).
Christensen and Caves (1980) performed what appears to be a study simi­
lar to Davies’s but used the Canadian railroad system. They argue that previous 
studies were a mix o f property rights, regulation and limited competition. They 
describe their work more as a test o f property rights isolated from these other 
effects on performance. They observe a failure to support the property rights 
contention and conclude that public ownership is not inherently less efficient 
than private ownership, and that it depends on market conditions. They also 
make it clear that, somewhat unusual for Government firms, the management 
o f the Canadian National Railway was independent o f politics and it was more 
a case o f just having the Government sit on Board. As they state it, the Cana­
dian National Railway was instructed to operate on a commercial basis under a 
management insulated from politics”(1980,p.974).
While it would appear that the Davies study supports the property rights 
contention and Christensen & Caves’s does not, one could read each as an aber­
ration. At best the property rights approach seems too simplistic. Little can be 
said about owenership without simulataneously testing contentions about com­
petition, regulation, and efficiency in the product/service markets. However,
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while the empirical tests o f property rights are made difficult, it is still an influ­
ential theorical model by virtue o f the fact that it associates greater organiza­
tional and productive effort with the prospect o f  a higher economic reward. Be­
sides property rights, another rationale fro why private hospitals have a perfor­
mance advantage is that they are highly centralized in a number o f ways and 
can take advantage o f certain economies o f scale. This is especially true in the 
areas o f planning, marketing, purchasing, hiring, data processing and human 
capital expertise. Overall, their ideas have no distinct financial implications for 
private hospitals. The study also does not attempt to  discuss any normative 
behaviour which the data support or deny about what is driving hospital perfor­
mance. The variety o f results surpasses the ability o f  some simplistic approach 
being able to adequately capture the information presented.
AGENCY THEORY
The models o f financial performance discussed so far all focus on the 
role o f the firm or who the owners are. As a result, the financial agency theory 
can be applied to hospitals. Agency theory takes an entirely different view o f 
what constitutes the firm. Namely, agency theory sees the world as, “ ...most 
organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set o f con­
tracting relationships among individuals. (Freeh, 1980,p.57). Viewed in this light, 
the question o f who owns the hospital is meaningless. Instead, the question is to 
decide which o f the several contracts that make up the firm are influential when 
it come to observations o f financial performance. Stated differently, hospital 
performance is actually a vector o f performance across a set o f contracts that 
are parties to the firm.
It is instructive to compare an agency view o f the firm with a traditional 
one. (see exhibit 1). Agency’s economic reality is the financial inventive and 
reward facing each o f the individual components o f the firm. To talk about firm 
performance is to discuss a legal fiction with no basis in fact. The firm’s perfor­
mance merely summarizes the accomplished facts o f its members.
Since property rights have already been discussed and also because it so 
pervades the literature, it is instructive to compare agency theory with property 
rights. Property rights addresses ownership in a single dimension, namely, own­
ership o f the firm. In the agency world, everyone owns something whether it 
be the financial capital supplied to the firm or the individual human capital sup­
plied to it and everyone acts in their own best interest to enhance the value o f
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their “property rights” . In short, agency theory views property rights as a ubiq­
uitous claim. Such claims manifest themselves through the contracting process.
Firms are therefore microcosms o f markets in general and are not differ­
ent to interfirm markets, except for the proximity advantages o f bringing the 
resources o f production together where this is worthwile. The other difference 
between property rights is that all distributions o f value from the firm come to 
residual claimants. In competitive markets, this assumption is that distributions 
o f  value can occur at any point along the financial accounting chains. Prices 
may be lower or higher than what would be optimal in more competitive set­
tings; expenses may reflect efficiencies o f operation or they may reflect distri­
butions to management. These are classic examples o f agency theory.
Property rights theory suffers from its close association to a perfect mar­
kets assumption where residual claimants drive the system. Agency theory finds 
its roots in imperfections which are rife in mixed and regulated markets. (Sil­
vers & Kauer, 1986)
The finance literature treats the agency framework as a study o f market 
imperfections 3* by focusing on the “costs”o f agent interactions relative to the 
idealized case o f perfect markets. According to Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet, 
agency problems derive from three sources: .
1. informational asymmetry where managers choose not to reveal the true na­
ture o f the firm to principals costlessly 4*
2. stockholder and bondholder interactions given the limited liability nature o f 
residual claims.
3. managerial consumption o f perquisites. (1981,p .7-22)
These problems get translated into so-called agency costs whenever they 
result in decisions that differ from those o f perfect market conditions, where 
everyone is acting to maximize shareholder wealth.
3*. This is to be distinguished from market inefficiency. A given level of agency cost can be 
quite consistent with market efficiency as long as one’s competitors have equal (or greater) 
levels of agency cost associated with their operation.
4*. One of the serious confusions in the agency literature is the distinction between agents and 
principals. Agents are generally taken la  include all existing residual claimants, managers, and 
other contractors to the firm. Principals include new capital suppliers.
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The agency perspective is especially helpful in hospitals with their un­
conventional corporate structure. Physicians, in particular, have a clear cut role 
in agency models o f  hospitals but do not fit neatly into corporate models since 
they are not quite employees, managers, owners, or customers o f  the firm. Pauly 
and Redisch recognized this in their article (1973,p .87-99).
By viewing hospital performance as a function o f  physicians, their view 
is really an agency model o f  the firm where physicians are the dominant agents. 
The influence o f  managers on performance is another aspect o f  agency theory. 
“Firm”performance may be the result o f  good versus bad management rather 
than a function o f  who supplies capital to the firm. (Clarkson, 1972 p.363-384) 
(Pauly, 9173 p .87-99).
The implications o f  agency theory for the study o f  ownership and performance 
is that instead o f  focusing on the distribution o f  legal rights (as in property rights), 
there is a focus on the distribution o f  gains. Such models are flexible enough to 
decouple firm performance into its composite parts and to look for performance 
which measures different influences besides the lagalities o f  ownership.
As Eugene Fama describes it, recognizing that ownership o f  capital 
should not be confused with ownership o f  the firm is a first step “ ...toward 
understanding that control over a firm’s decisions is not necessarily the prov­
ince o f  security holders”(1980,p.290). Very little theoretical analysis has been 
under taken about agency costs in not-for-profit settings, and there is little in 
the way o f  empirical findings to draw from. Picking up on legal prohibition 
against ownership in the public hospitals, Clarkson writes that one would ex­
pect to see two things in public hospitals.
First, more elaborate sets o f  rules and a wider diversity in the rules would 
be found in public hospitals. The presumption is that the rules i.e. more specific 
sets o f  contracts would made up for the economic incentives otherwise in place 
to control shirking 5*. Second, there would be a greater variability o f  input 
selection for a given output. (Douglas, 1984,p.42)
One o f  the important contributions is to control for the incentives and 
qualities o f  one o f  the important internal agents to hospital decisions, namely, 
management. Performance results can then be attributed to other agents such as 
physicians, capital supplies or patient/payors.
The difficulty is in measuring agency costs. The coarseness o f  our ac­
counting data simply does not permit one to distinguish between the production
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efficiency costs o f operation versus those tainted with agency costs. This is a 
problem associated with there being no standard, no absolutely perfect market­
place, such that all others would differ by an agency cost element. The theory’s 
appeal is its hardship: everywhere one looks there are examples o f agency costs 
but there is no reference for measurement.
Even relative measures are made difficult by the efficiency o f markets. 
Players deficient in terms o f their control o f agency costs are quickly driven 
from the market as they are unable to compete with less costly alternatives. 
What one firm gains by increasing in size and specializing may be offset by the 
increasing costs o f monitoring diverse and numerous decision agents.
As a consequence, all firms equilibrate around a competitive norm where 
it is impossible to distinguish agency costs o f other costs such as those o f  pro­
duction, development and so forth. About the only conditions where one could 
imagine cost differences being allowed to nurture themselves, is in regulated 
markets or otherwise non-competitive situations. Eeven so, agency costs must 
remain a rubric for cost discrepancies in general. The analogy is the difficulty 
in discerning in restrospect between what a person wants to do versus what 
they are capable o f doing. Measured behaviour in either case will look alarm­
ingly the same.
In conclusion, the agency approach remains a powerful means o f under­
standing the plethora o f problems in corporate finance in spite o f an inability to 
measure them 6*. If  this is true in relatively efficient markets, it is doubly true 
in inefficient ones which provide firms with the opportunity to go their separate 
ways. Whatever production, management or control cost differences exist should 
show themselves best where the capital markets are relaxed in terms o f their 
return requirements. This has been, until recently, the case for hospitals.
5* He notes that because property rights in the public setting are poorly defined, those institu­
tions put resources into fixed assets, manager perks, charity care, and other uses in patterns 
different from the private hospitals.
6*. Agency theory isn’t alone in this conditions, of course. The same may be said for many 
powerful theories such as the perfect markets notion in economics. The theory's contribution is 
that it is helpful to our understanding not that it is measurable or not.
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